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The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the literature on the political 
economy of policy instrument choice and relate it to the experiences in agriculture. This 
paper identifies two key bodies of literature that are at the core in explaining inefficient 
policy instruments: 
(1)  Enforcement and commitment problems for promises of policies by 
politicians, and of voting by individuals 
(2)  Information and agency problems between various participants in the political 
process 
The theories are based on explicit politic-economic models in a rational actor framework. The 
models generally make prior assumptions about what policies are available without 
explaining these choices by either basic policy transactions costs or political economy 
models.   
The analysis is extended to include the fact that often times instrument choice is a 
discrete 0,1 occurrence in response to a crisis and therefore is path dependent. Policy 
persistence is also widespread and so reasons for a status quo bias are provided. Furthermore, 
policy changes are often bundled economy wide and so are not specific to agriculture. 
Finally, we analyze how effective trade agreements have been in improving policy instrument 
choice. 
It is important to note that one cannot always analyze the politics of policy instrument 
choice alone. There is no dichotomy between means and ends because ends are themselves 
the means to a more final objective (e.g., re-election). Choosing a policy objective and 
choosing a policy instrument are therefore not separable processes. The politics of who gets 
the transfer and the level is simultaneous with the politics of policy instrument choice. As 
noted by Becker (1985): “a satisfactory analysis of the choice of method must consider 
whether the influence function itself depends on the methods used.” For example, farmers are 
powerful but why are there inefficient policy instruments? Or is policy instrument choice   2
really independent of being powerful? For ease of exposition, we assume one group has more 
political power to begin with and then explain policy instrument choice. 
It is also difficult to draw the line between explaining inefficient policies versus 
inefficient institutions (economic, political and legal) that generate these inefficient policy 
instruments. The focus here will be on policies and generally assumes institutions are 
exogenous. The political models evaluated in this paper revolve around distributional 
conflicts that invariably generate inefficient policy instrument choice. 
Before we can develop a theory of inefficient policy instrument choice (for example, 
why are price supports used over lump sum transfers?), we must agree not only as to what is 
most efficient but also be able to rank alternative policies in terms of their efficiency in order 
to assess the trends in agricultural policy instrument choice worldwide. This is particularly 
important for ranking transfer efficiency, as the political roots of most agricultural policies 
are to transfer income to farmers. 
The paper is therefore organized as follows. The next section provides a ranking of 
policies as to their transfer efficiency and determines the standard of evaluation, given that no 
policy is perfect in achieving its goals. The third section explores why political competition 
does not ensure that an efficient policy instrument is chosen. The following two sections 
explain the two key theories: enforcement and commitment problems in Section 4, and 
information and agency problems in Section 5. Section 6 presents the important Grossman-
Helpman model of inefficient policy choice that falls outside these two general theories. 
Section 7 describes how policy instrument choice in agriculture is often a discrete outcome in 
response to a crisis and therefore becomes path dependent, resulting in a status quo bias. 
Section 8 describes how trade agreements can affect policy instrument choice. The final 
section gives some guidance as to the outstanding issues. 
2.  Determining the standard of evaluation 
The basic tradition in economics is that an optimal government policy to remedy 
market failures (including the achievement of income distribution goals) is to maximize 
social welfare subject to constraints. Observed policies often appear to deviate from the 
optima. Taking international trade as an example, any restriction is inefficient (unless there is 
a non-economic goal or if a country wishes to exploit its terms of trade, an issue I return to 
later). Among trade restrictions, there have been a series of complex non-tariff import 
restrictions like voluntary export restraints, minimum price agreements and tariff rate import 
quotas. Meanwhile, domestic price support policies have been extremely complex with a 
myriad of provisions with loopholes and opportunities for adjusting behavior. Environmental 
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regulations including those under the rubric of “multifunctionality” have also generally been 
inefficient. Biofuel polices are an example with a piecemeal proliferation of excessively 
costly methods of intervention (Koplow, 2007). Furthermore, there is widespread evidence of 
an overall underinvestment in public goods with a bias for particular types (e.g., credit 
subsidies). 
Because farm income goals has been the primary reason for agricultural trade and 
price support policies, especially in rich countries, a key question is what is the most efficient 
way to transfer income to farmers? Standard economic theory prescribes lump-sum transfers. 
Some argue this is largely irrelevant for actual policy and prone to theoretical criticism 
because in order to operate this redistribution mechanism, the government would need to 
have knowledge of every single agent's preferences and endowment. But attempts to 
implement lump sum transfers inevitably destroys the incentives to acquire skill or reveal it in 
one’s work as agents have no incentive to truthfully reveal that information. Because the 
government is not omnipotent, it will never be able to implement such a scheme (Hammond 
1979, Mirrlees, 1986). There are also other unavoidable ‘political transactions costs’ like the 
transactions costs of administration, monitoring and compliance. To develop a political 
model that explains inefficient policy choice, ideally the policy availability set is also 
endogenous. Furthermore, because of the considerations above, the predictions of a non-
political model may very well coincide with the political model. The task of explaining 
inefficient policy choice is therefore very complex. 
There is also the problem of endogeneity. Two different cases are relevant. First, 
some policy instruments are more vulnerable to rent-seeking. For example, Tullock (1983), 
assuming imperfect information, argues that direct income payments, while more efficient in 
a standard economic analysis, generates unique incentives to rent seek and thus results in 
more redistribution and ultimately inefficiency. Alston (2007) lends credence to this view by 
showing how decoupled payments have been inferior to complete elimination of policy 
interventions. Second, there can be false attribution of deadweight costs between two policy 
instruments (Swinnen and de Gorter 1998). For example, the current debate over biofuel 
policies has proponents arguing these policies increase the price of corn and thereby reduces 
tax costs of farm subsidy programs. But the setting of loan rates and target prices themselves 
are affected by biofuel policies. Higher corn prices (and prices for related crops) give 
politicians an incentive to increase price supports compared to a situation of no biofuel 
policies and lower crop prices with burgeoning taxpayer costs. For example, the recent House 
Farm Bill proposes an increase in loan rates and target prices for several crops. Estimates of 
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the welfare effects of one policy assuming other policies are unaffected can be seriously 
biased.  
To summarize, because lump sum transfers are incentive incompatible, incur political 
transactions costs and can involve policy endogeneity, it is very difficult to decide on what 
the appropriate reference point for efficiency is. The standard of evaluation for efficiency is 
inevitably the first best in a second best world (or what is least bad). This is not an easy task 
to resolve. We now turn to some resolution of this issue. 
Towards a ranking of efficient policy instruments 
Before we can develop a political model explaining inefficient policy choice, we need 
to agree in principle as to what is efficient and be able to rank alternative policies in terms of 
their inefficiency. The approach taken in this paper is that there is a general ordering of 
policy efficiency, all the issues described above not withstanding. But before presenting this, 
let us assess the traditional literature on transfer efficiency. 
The traditional approach is to compare individual policies in a general welfare 
theoretic framework along the lines of Gardner (1983).
1 Even if the analysis includes 
multiple policy goals, interest groups and policy instruments, the two most important issues 
outstanding that cause disagreements among economists as to what policy is more efficient 
are (1) the marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB); and (2) a country being able to exploit 
their international terms of trade.
2
The issue of the MEB of taxation and its role in assessing the efficiency of alternative 
agricultural policy instruments was first considered by Munk (1977, 1980, 1987, 1989, 1991, 
1993) who argues producer co-responsibility levies and trade policies involving consumer 
transfers are more efficient than decoupled payments. This is what is known as the “double 
dividend” hypothesis in the environmental economics literature: you get to transfer monies to 
farmers at low cost because the deadweight costs of distortions in the agricultural market are 
low due to inelastic demand and supply while at the same time saving taxpayers costs, 
allowing for a reduction in general income taxes and thereby in the associated deadweight 
costs. This point was also highlighted by Gardner (1983) and analyzed further, among others, 
by Alston (1990; 1991; 2007). The savings in the excess burden of wage taxes were 
purported to be 20-50 cents on the dollar (and as high as $1.50 on the dollar - see Feldstein, 
1999). 
The international terms of trade argument for government intervention has a long 
history in agricultural economics (see for example Schmitz et al., 1981). The overall 
conclusion in this literature is that by incorporating the MEB of taxation and the international 
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terms of trade effects, decoupled payments are not necessarily the most efficient policy 
instrument.  
Taking current biofuel policies as an example, this same literature may deem these 
efficient because they cause a spike in food prices that transfer income to farmers, thereby 
lessoning the need for taxpayer funded decoupled farm subsidies while at the same time 
improving the terms of trade in corn exports, oil imports and ethanol imports (de Gorter and 
Just 2007). The approach taken in this paper departs from the traditional literature in that 
trade policies are always deemed inefficient and that the MEB of taxation should not be taken 
into account in most situations, especially for rich countries where the transactions costs of 
general taxation is not very large.  
Trade policies are inefficient because each country’s policy interventions are self-
defeating as it reduces world prices, causing other countries to react by increasing policy 
interventions to compensate. This leads to ever spiraling decline in world prices. The 
penultimate section of this paper shows how international trade agreements can help in 
overcoming these negative terms of trade effects in agriculture and shows how in general it is 
in each country’s best interest not to try to exploit international terms of trade.
3 We therefore 
now turn our attention to the reason why the MEB of taxation should not be considered as a 
major factor in assessing the efficiency of alternative policy instruments in agriculture. 
Why the MEB of taxation should not be a major factor 
There are several problems with including the MEB of taxation in assessing the 
efficiency of alternative policy instruments in agriculture. First, if the MEB of taxation is 
included, then one also has to take into account the effect of the relative food price distortion 
with all other goods in economy (OECD 1994). This means the MEB of taxation is 
inappropriately modeled because it brings in a general equilibrium effect in a partial 
equilibrium framework. The inefficiency created by a relative price distortion in agricultural 
prices relative to  all other goods in the economy was first formalized by Bovenberg and de 
Mooij (1994). The burgeoning literature after this called it the “tax interaction effect.” 
Increased commodity prices magnify the deadweight costs of the pre-existing distortion 
(wage tax) because the commodity price spike reduces real wages and so discourages work. 
The labor supply curve shifts left and this generates a rectangular deadweight costs (the tax 
base erodes as consumers substitute away from the taxed good). This requires a higher tax to 
maintain tax revenues. Subsequent research has shown the tax interaction effect is indeed 
important. For example, Browning’s (1997) analysis of a monopoly finds that the tax 
interaction effect is 5-15 times the deadweight costs of a monopoly using standard partial 
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equilibrium analysis. The empirical research by Goulder and Williams (2003) also finds that 
the tax interaction effect often dominates the Ramsey pricing effect of a spike in commodity 
prices.
4  
Second, there are two distortions associated with an income tax: the ‘distortionary 
effect’ which is the welfare difference between a distorting tax and a lump-sum tax; and a 
‘revenue effect’ which measures the welfare cost (gain) in disbursing the tax revenues. The 
MEB of taxation is based purely on compensated responses or the ‘distortionary’ effect. 
Estimates derived by Fullerton (1991) concludes that the ‘revenue effect’ can be large, 
resulting in a 75 percent reduction in the MEB of taxation when these income effects were 
included.
5
Third, once the marginal deadweight costs of consumer transfers in the agricultural 
market reaches the MEB of taxation, the optimal policy for any further transfers requires both 
taxpayer and consumer transfers. Once the consumer ‘catch-up” tax has been reached; the 
complexity of now including decoupled payments introduces other possible sources of 
inefficiency.
6
Finally, consumer transfers necessarily require trade restrictions that negate the 
mutual gains from policy disarmament worldwide.
7 We turn to that issue in the penultimate 
section of the paper. 
The conclusion we therefore draw is that the first best policies to achieve farm income 
goals have the feature of no direct market interventions (free trade with no market price 
distortions). This necessarily means no international terms of trade improvements (except that 
experienced by all countries that all move to free trade) and the sole use of taxpayer financed 
transfers to farmers. The traditional model of transfer efficiency that compares production 
quotas involving consumer transfers with taxpayer financed payments does not apply, even if 
the MEB of taxation is high. Consumer transfers with import barriers and export subsidies are 
deemed inferior to taxpayer financed buyouts or decoupled payments (OECD 1994, 2001; 
Dewbre et al.), regardless if the MEB of taxation is high or low.
8 Even if the MEB is high, 
the decrease in U.S. GDP is sufficiently low that it will not significantly adversely affect 
other countries exports. The effect would be too indirect.   
Ideally, governments would unilaterally eliminate all inefficient agricultural policies 
and replace them with policies that target the market failure. For income distribution goals, a 
one-time unconditional payment is preferred, a subsidy buy-out, to all engaged in farming or 
deemed in need of compensation as an annuity (bond) that is non-transferable to the farmer’s 
successors, and non-renewable (Beard and Swinbank, 2001; Swinbank and Tranter 2004, 
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Tangermann, 1991; Swinbank and Tangermann, 2001).
9 However, the decoupling experience 
shows that there can be problems not only because of the design of programs and their 
implementation but also for political constraints. This indicates that with anything short of an 
ideal decoupling scheme, some distortions will continue.
10 Features that will increase the 
effectiveness of a less than ideal decoupling scheme include: 
•  Make payment program transitory and for adjustment purposes only. 
•  Strict payment limitations per farm and based on income rather than current or 
historical production. 
•  Require no constraints on input use.  
•  Implement credible and time consistent policies with no changes in the eligibility 
rules, payments or eligible sectors or farmers. 
•  Discontinue all other coupled programs.  




Why does a competitive political market not ensure efficiency? 
A counterargument to the political economy literature on inefficient policy instrument 
choice is that competition in the political market place will ensure the most efficient policy 
instrument will be chosen (Stigler 1981; Wittman 1989; Becker 1976). Becker (1976) argues 
“The methods used to accomplish any given end tend to be the most efficient 
available, in the public as well as the market sector (most efficient firms and political 
parties survive)…”  
Market failures are Pareto efficient; if available, private individuals or institutions would 
correct for market failures. All observed policy instruments are therefore efficient and are 
expected to be chosen. If losers fail to oppose the policy, then it was not worthwhile and if 
gainers strategically increased the political costs, then the losers should have anticipated this. 
Most political economy models, including the revealed preference models with a 
policy criterion function, assume governments are efficient in achieving policy goals 
(Bullock 1995).  For example, both the collective action model of Becker (1983) and the 
politician-voter model of Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) assume full information and 
certainty on policy effects by all economic agents involved. Competition between collective 
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action lobby groups in Becker (1983) and between politicians in Swinnen and de Gorter 
(1993) ensures that the most efficient instrument is used.   
There is a weaker form of the hypothesis that governments tend to choose efficient 
policy instruments (Becker 1958; Gardner 1987). Becker (1958) argues that there is relatively 
little to choose between an ideal free enterprise system and ideal political democracy but 
ignorance of voters and the large scale required of political organizations are two forces 
producing imperfections. Acemoglu (2003) argues that politics is special because of the 
complex interaction between politicians, voters, lobbies, legislatures and the bureaucracy. 
There is empirical evidence of a tendency (over a long period of time) towards more 
efficient policy instruments in agriculture. The EU moved from open-ended price supports 
and export subsidies to producer co-responsibility levies, production/acreage controls and 
now to decoupled payments. There have been major reforms in developing countries 
beginning in the 1980s. Similarly, there have been developments in United States with the 
freezing of payment yields and base acres in the 1985 Farm Bill and the move to decoupled 
payments in the 1996 Farm Bill. The tobacco and peanut production quota buyouts are also 
evidence of a change towards more efficient policies. In Canada meanwhile, the Agricultural 
Stabilization Act, the Western Grain Stabilization Act and subsidies under the Western Grain 
Transportation Act have been terminated, and the National Tripartite Stabilization Program 
and the Gross Revenue Insurance Program are being phased out in favour of amore general 
income insurance plan for all farmers. At the same time, there has been a move toward trade 
liberalization in agriculture in the Doha negotiations while developing countries have 
unilaterally reformed domestic agricultural and trade policies in the past two decades. In 
developed countries, domestic subsidy policies too have in general become less complex and 
more decoupled. The switch from a coupled towards a decoupled program is undertaking a 
significant step in the right direction of a more efficient policy instrument choice. 
Empirical tests for policy instrument efficiency in agriculture have been undertaken 
and the conclusions are mixed (Gardner 1987; Beghin and Karp 1991; Bullock 1995). The 
outcome is found to depend on the number of interest groups, policy goals and the set of 
policy instruments used or available. 
The challenge is to identify what specific “transaction costs” would systematically 
prevent a competitive political market place from ensuring the choice of efficient policy 
instrument choice. The literature rules out efficient methods of redistribution and takes it for 
granted that rent-maximizing behavior by rulers or the government will result in 
inefficiencies. Andersen (1995) argues that trade policy is used over a more efficient subsidy 
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because the latter has more concentrated costs on politically powerful group (urban 
capitalists). But why do politicians and powerful social groups not make a deal with the rest 
of the society to choose the policies and institutions that maximize output (or social welfare), 
and then redistribute part of the gains to themselves?  We now discuss two general theories 
on why this does not occur.  
3.  Enforcement and commitment problems 
Political promises are not formally legal contracts because contractual penalties are 
not enforceable by third parties. Governments or candidates may renege on their policy 
promises while citizens may renege on their promised votes (Acemoglu 2003). Political 
enforcement mechanisms (like elections) are imperfect. Equilibria under self-enforcement 
constraints are typically inefficient (Powell 2004). 
Political and economic trades between various individuals and groups are inter-
temporal, and need to rely on contracts and promises. Contracts and explicit promises by “the 
state” are non-enforceable. Allocation of political power creates an inherent commitment 
problem, undermining the potential to reach efficient outcomes. The commitment problem is 
twofold:  
1.  Politicians (incumbent or rival) cannot make commitments to bind their future actions 
2.  Voters cannot commit to politicians in the future, because the latter no longer possess 
the political power to enforce such promises 
As a result, efficiency considerations are not separable from distributional conflicts. 
Incentive-compatible promises can make up for lack of enforceable contracts, but 
generally fall short of achieving the efficient outcome. Political and economic forces will 
sometimes push towards more efficient social arrangements. If the relationship between the 
state and the citizens is repeated, there may be some amount of commitment based on 
reputation, supported by the threat of future punishments. The possibility of commitment via 
constitutions or other institutions can substitute for a reputation-based commitment 
enforcement of contracts. The extent of distributional conflict between various groups in 
society will also affect the outcome (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001b). 
The inefficiencies do not arise because of political transactions costs mentioned 
earlier but because of the political-economic interactions between politicians, voters and 
interest groups. 
For developing countries, Robinson and Verdier (2002) argue clientelism is key to 
induce voters to support its candidates. Patronage occurs for those who do support and there 
is an appeal to the collective interest in an effort to elicit votes. The hypotheses are that 
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farmers with no power are taxed or in democracies, the farmers are not swing voters (instead 
perhaps ideological voters) or cannot solve the collective action problem. Institutional factors 
condition the outcome. For example, the fewer the constraints on the exercise of power, the 
worse policy will be. Situations that have more clientelism will generate less favorable 
agricultural policy. 
Application of the enforcement and commitment theory to agriculture 
In one of the more important papers on inefficient redistribution, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001a) argue that inefficient redistribution policies in agriculture like price 
supports are enacted to encourage newcomers in order for farmers to maintain future political 
power. Choosing policy objectives are therefore not separable from choosing policy 
instruments.  
Inefficient policy instruments are necessary to be consistent with the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the government. Because politicians cannot commit today to future policies and 
over some range, political power increases with group size, inefficient redistribution may 
arise as a way to expand or maintain the size of a group in order to sustain its future political 
power (not just reward those already engaged in the industry). To begin, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001a) assume farmers have sufficient political influence to induce a transfer from 
the government (could be lump-sum). Two categories of inefficient redistributive policies are 
identified: 
1.  “Inefficient targeting” distorts the extensive margin — policies that encourage people 
to enter a sector where their productivity is low 
2.  “Inefficient conditioning” distorts the intensive margin — policies that affect the 
marginal production decision and encourage production beyond an efficient amount 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) explain that lump sum transfers would not encourage 
entrants or discourage exit so “inefficient targeting” explains inefficient policy choice like 
open-ended price supports. But Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) also argue that politicians 
do not want many more people to enter the sector and reduce per-capita transfers. Thus, 
subsidies conditional on acreage or production controls) are implemented. There is a trade-off 
between “inefficient conditioning”  and “inefficient targeting”. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001a) appeal to Becker (1985):  
“…subsidized groups try to limit the entry of additional members because that dilutes 
the gains of established members… acreage restrictions encourage fewer farmers than 
output subsidies do…” 
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There are two problems with Becker’s (1985) conclusion. First, an acreage restriction 
or output subsidy is dominated by an acreage payment per existing farm or by a decoupled 
payment per existing farmer. Second, it is not altogether clear that for the same level of 
transfer, restrictions on output/acreage receiving support results in higher efficiency and 
lower farm numbers. Indeed, the opposite is expected for the many piecemeal programs in 
agriculture that have evolved over time. In fact, de Gorter, Just and Kropp (2008) shows that 
infra-marginal support can even be more distorting than a fully coupled subsidy in achieving 
a farm income goal. 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001a) theory is that open-ended price supports are 
inefficient and that governments use infra-marginal support policies (defined to include 
quotas, bases, acreage restrictions, farm payment limits, etc.) that are at the same time more 
efficient and prevent dilution by reducing the number of farms receiving support. Price 
supports are deemed economically efficient and politically effective because it attracts 
newcomers (or prevents exit) and so helps maintain the political power of farmers. But 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) argue further that subsidies conditional on production or 
acreage controls may be useful to limit entry so farmer wealth is not diluted.  
The analysis by de Gorter, Just and Kropp (2008) get exactly the opposite results from 
that of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a). There are three primary reasons for this divergence. 
First, exit deterrence where higher support for only part of a farmer’s output induces high 
cost firms into the industry (or prevent exits). This increases inefficiency and farm numbers 
simultaneously. Second, cross-subsidization occurs where farmers have an incentive to 
expand output beyond the level receiving support (taxpayer or consumer financed) even 
though the market price is below average costs of production. Losses on marginal output are 
offset by profits on infra-marginal output. Farms move down the average cost curves to 
capture increasing returns. Third, there is a situation where both exit deterrence and cross-
subsidization occurs where farms are unprofitable at the infra-marginal output level even with 
support but find it profitable to produce where price is below costs of production but only 
because of the support on the supported part of total output. Although the de Gorter, Just and 
Kropp (2008) theory argues that infra-marginal support results in aggregate inefficiency, 
what is important for politicians is that inefficiency per farm may be lower where the 
objective is to maximize political support. 
The political controversy over policy instrument choice in the history of U.S 
agriculture has been a storied one but the same debate surfaces over the decades: should there 
be some form of limitation on production (farms) receiving support, should it be taxpayer or 
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consumer financed, and how should (restricted) support be delivered.  For example Benedict 
and Stine (1955) writing about U.S. peanut policy 1933-1953 conclude that “Nearly all the 
various price-support measures have been used or tried in the programs related to peanuts”.   
The controversial Brannan Plan in 1949 sought to replace production quotas with a 
more flexible standard of farm income, expanding the sectors covered by support, and 
establishing a ceiling as to how much a farmer could receive. The plan failed and the status 
quo prevailed. 
The same controversy occurred with the Cochrane supply control proposal in 1962 
which had many features of extending quotas to other sectors and limiting the payments per 
farm. It too was defeated but there seems to always be a political tendency to spread the 
benefits to more farmers and limiting the payments per farm.
11 This provides credence to 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001a) theory except the type of policies they deem part of 
“inefficient conditioning” should be reversed and made part of “inefficient targeting” and 
vice-versa. This makes their model more powerful in explaining the choice of inefficient 
policy instruments in agriculture. Using OECD data, the trend in world agriculture is towards 
more support (both consumer and taxpayer financed) that has limitations or is infra-marginal 
(de Gorter, Just and Kropp, 2007). Examples of infra-marginal support programs in 
agriculture abound: 
o  U.S. marketing allotments, marketing and production quotas, base acres, price 
discrimination with marketing orders, restrictions on payments and eligibility, counter 
cyclical payments, MILC for dairy, CCPs, etc. 
o  EU “maximum guarantee quantities” – MGQs was probably one of the biggest infra-
marginal subsidy program of all times, converted to base acres and placed in the Blue 
Box in the URAA, co-responsibility levies, base acres, environmental cross-
compliance and “multifunctionality” payments, etc. 
o  Production quotas in Canada, the EU and United States with restrictions on transfers 
between farms and provinces/countries/counties (e.g., 20 percent of quotas sales held 
back for entrants) 
5.  Information and agency problems 
The basic premise is that politicians or lobby groups deceive voters or withhold 
information from ‘rationally ignorant voters’. Because of incomplete and asymmetric 
information, politicians have the incentive to obfuscate. Although the benefits of an 
inefficient policy are concentrated, the policy may have external effects whereby perceived 
benefits spread to other voters. An example is current U.S. biofuels policy where the 
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concentrated benefits to farmers and ethanol producers are justified in terms of reduced 
dependence on oil (especially from the Middle East) and enhanced national security while 
reducing local pollution and global warming, and accelerating rural development. 
 
Obfuscation of information increases politicians’ re-election chances by increasing 
the costs of program evaluation. The question arises as to why competing politicians do not 
inform voters and the exploit gains. One reason is that property rights to program benefits and 
their costs are poorly defined in political marketplace. For example, geographic 
representation and the role of a legislature results in vote trading, facilitated by special 
interest politics and obfuscation (Shepsle, Weingast and Johansen 1981; Bayliss and Rausser 
2001). Uncertainty, concealed costs and disguised transfers maintains the political strength of 
the vested interest group. Politicians and bureaucrats divulge selective information in order to 
both create and maintain a constituency. 
Coate and Morris (1995) offer a very interesting model with politician-voter 
information asymmetries. Voters are postulated to face two types of uncertainty: policy 
uncertainty where one option is that an efficient policy may be chosen; and politician 
uncertainty where there is uncertainty about the type of politician. Uncertainty and 
asymmetric information between the effects of policies and the predisposition of politicians 
has rational governments implementing disguised transfer mechanisms with concealed costs.  
Policy and politician uncertainty results in a concern by politicians about reputation and so 
inefficient instruments are chosen.   
  There are many variations of the commitment/information themes. Models are varied, 
including models with lobbying, elections, the legislature or bureaucracy. The importance of 
congressional committee structure is emphasized by Weingast and Marshall (1988). Foster 
and Rausser (1993) find commodity policy involving deadweight costs is chosen over lump 
sum transfers because the effect of cost-reducing public research has differential effects 
across a heterogeneous group of farmers. Farmers as a group can lose from public research, 
but price supports forestall the farmers’ blocking coalition, thus assuring the political 
feasibility of welfare-enhancing public research expenditures.  Hence the political need to 
compensate a minimum blocking coalition from vetoing efficiency-enhancing government 
policies results in the choice of commodity policy over what appears to be more efficient 
instruments. 
  Chambers (1992) uses principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information 
to uncover the link between the choice of farm policy tools and the redistributional 
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preferences of agricultural policymakers.  In examining motivations underlying the choice of 
agricultural policy mechanisms that differ across sectors, he determines that supply control 
mechanisms favor high-cost producers and taxpayers, while mechanisms favoring 
overproduction favor low-cost producers. Farmers are assumed to have more information as 
to the policy effects, and Chambers (1992) shows how different government objectives (for 
example budget concerns and the interests of different segments of farm sectors) are reflected 
in the choice of agricultural policy instruments.   
o  de Janvry and Sadoulet (1993): land reforms - governments first modernize farms 
which allows landlords to reinforce political power (game-theoretic with lobbying and 
path dependency). 
o  Besley and Coate (1995): efficient policies would affect the identity of who is in 
power. 
o  Becker and Mulligan (2003): if level of redistribution is endogenous, then politicians 
commit to using inefficient methods in order to reduce total redistribution. 
o  Alesina and Tabellini (1990): inefficient policy alleviates time inconsistency problem 
(parties’ tie each others hands – not pursuing votes). 
o  Lohmann (1998) adds to Coate and Morris with politician-voter information 
asymmetries. 
  
6.  The Grossman-Helpman theory of inefficient policy choice 
Grossman and Helpman (1995; 1996) specify a principal-agent model where 
government welfare is a weighted average of economic welfare and contributions from 
lobbies. Lobbies employ truthful payment schedules so the government maximizes welfare of 
principals and agent taken together. Government welfare is therefore a function of the policy 
through the latter’s effect on the welfare of the polity and in contributions received. A Pareto 
efficient policy results if all groups are lobbying because free trade is the choice as politicians 
are no worse off but everybody else is. This means the model has a prisoner’s dilemma for 
lobbies only. If the lobbies could commit to an ex ante political institution, it would not be for 
lump-sum transfers but for an inefficient instrument. The government views lobbies as 
perfect substitutes and so a lobby cannot affect government by withholding. The government 
wields a credible threat to cut any lobby out of a deal at no cost to itself.  
If there is only one lobby, the government cannot bestow benefits on another lobby 
and get its contribution. The one lobby therefore gets the entire surplus. If there are two lobby 
groups or more, then the government gets the entire surplus in the form of contributions. If 
   15
competition amongst lobbies is intense, the availability of an efficient instrument makes 
credible the government’s threat to join forces with rival lobbies. It is therefore possible for 
lobbies to be better off with an inefficient policy instrument that ties the hands of 
government. This generates an equivalent outcome to basic models of lobbying by Becker 
(1983) or of politician-voter interaction by Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) but for different 
reasons. In both the Becker (1983) and Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) models, replacing an 
inefficient policy instrument with a more efficient one allows lobbies and politicians to 
achieve better results while using fewer resources in lobbying. In the Grossman-Helpman 
model, efficient policies result because government attaches some weight to social welfare. 
If all voters are organized by a lobby, lobbies must contribute more to get free trade 
with an output subsidy (efficient) than with trade policy (inefficient) because a lobby must 
contribute the difference between what the government and other lobbies can achieve in the 
absence of the lobby’s participation and what they get if it does lobby. Rival lobbies and 
government can achieve higher welfare without subsidies so the lobbies’ contributions will be 
higher and net welfare of the lobby lower if the political regime allows for an efficient policy 
instrument. Therefore, extent of political competition determines preferences for alternative 
policy instrument types. If there is little competition, then lobbies want to extract resources at 
the expense of underrepresented majority and so an efficient instrument is desired. 
The Grossman-Helpman result on inefficient policy choice occurs outside their model 
in that lobbies have an incentive to favor institutional change that restricts the ability of 
governments to choose an efficient policy instrument. This begs the question why lobbies 
would not favor instead institutional change to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma facing them. 
Furthermore, some argue that the inclusion of more interest groups was a reason for why 
agricultural policy reform in Australia was successful, a result that contradicts the prediction 
of the Grossman-Helpman model. Nevertheless, research by Acemoglu and Robinson find in 
developing countries that a more competitive political system generates lower quality 
institutions and policy choice it reduces flexibility for politicians to undertake policy reform. 
7.  Discrete policy changes, path dependency and the status quo bias 
A distinguishing feature of agricultural policies is that once a policy is put in place, 
there is inertia in the political system with respect to changing the instrument, with changes 
made often only incrementally over long periods of time. This reflects both the path 
dependency of policy instrument choice and a bias for the status quo. The introduction or 
removal of policy measures has often been abrupt and major, and infrequent, often in 
response to a crisis.  The crisis in the great depression initiated U.S. farm policy while the 
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aftermath of WWII instigated the EU’s agricultural policy. Meanwhile, marketing boards in 
Africa are holdovers from colonial times. 
This means there is a need to explain the persistence of a policy instrument. One 
possible explanation is that the capitalization of program benefits means the benefits of the 
policy are only captured by incumbents at the time of the policy was introduced. This 
imposes severe harm on newcomers and so over time, the program does not benefit the 
people the program intended to help. Eliminating or reforming the policy instrument will 
harm those who bought the rights to the program benefits in the form of high asset values. 
Coate and Morris (1999) reject the usual proposition that policy persistence arises 
from powerful interest groups defending current policies. Instead, they develop an agency 
model with lobbying where once a policy is introduced, agents make investments in order to 
benefit from them. This action increases their willingness to pay in the future and forego 
support for policies which provide temporary efficiency. This translates into political pressure 
to maintain the status quo. Implementation of a specific policy increases the political 
effectiveness of beneficiaries. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a, 2001b) argue that inefficient instruments serve in 
effect as commitment device because it may be harder to reverse than a lump-sum transfer. 
Dixit (1996) offers a theory where policy actions are durable; once implemented, they are not 
easily unwound. Vested interests defend the status quo because of the irreversible 
investments due to the policy. Buyouts are not available because of political transactions 
costs. Democratic political processes a bundle of political positions so path dependent 
inefficiency or lock-in results. 
Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe (1999) describe the “process establishment” such as 
producer associations and legislative committees that represents fixed institutional capital in 
U.S. politics that is most likely to be overcome only by some exogenous event. Psychology 
offers another explanation for the status quo bias. An important augmentation of the political 
support function for voter resistance to change is to incorporate Thaler’s (1991) theory of the 
endowment income effect where people demand more to give it up than to acquire it. Another 
possibility would be to include prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) for politicians, 
support from voters, and voters’ economic welfare. This would imply that the slope of the 
political support function is much steeper for losses. Loss aversion (where losses loom larger 
than gains) is a common psychological bias, independent of endowment incomes, so 
symmetry and reversibility of policy instrument choice does not hold.  
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Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) develop a theory of status quo bias whereby a future 
gain from an institutional reform is uncertain, and the distribution among various social 
groups is difficult to predict relative to the obvious loss of the specific group. Opposition to 
reform tends to be strongly organized while support is only weakly so. Their paper shows that 
some gainers or losers from reform cannot be identified ex ante. Many policy reforms that are 
politically sustainable ex post will not be adopted ex ante even though agents are risk-neutral, 
rational, and forward-looking. Uncertainty prevents reform and so large reform is needed to 
overcome the status quo bias.  
Basu, Jones, and Schlicht (1987) argue that developing countries continue to be 
trapped in economic stagnation and poverty under a dysfunctional system because of 
‘structural’ and ‘inertial’ institutions or policies.  The former are institutions bound and 
demanded by competing forces in response to transaction costs while the latter are 
institutions as products of history or origin (the importance of policy path dependency).   
De Janvry and Sadoulet (1989) offer an explanation for the limited success of land 
reforms, which fail to be redistributive because governments first modernize large farms, 
which allows landlords to reinforce their political power. This allows them to receive credible 
commitments of non-expropriation if they modernize or lobby to externalize the cost of 
modernization such that expropriation with compensation becomes no longer feasible. De 
Janvry and Sadoulet (1989) use a game-theoretic framework between landlords and 
government by integrating lobbying with government behavior to show that policy change is 
a path-dependent sequence of events.  Governments have a short-term political horizon and 
high discount rate for economic gains such that future losers block policy change. 
Not only are policy changes often discrete, there are also often bundled (economy 
wide) rather than focusing on agriculture alone. New Zealand is a case in point where an 
economic crisis precipitated micro and macro reforms where all agricultural policy 
interventions were abandoned, all service sectors where de-regulated, free trade was 
implemented, FDI was encouraged and the exchange rate was allowed to float freely. Similar 
outcomes occurred in Latin American countries in the past two decades. 
8.  Impact of trade agreements on policy instrument choice 
International organizations like the WTO can be used strategically by political actors 
in domestic political battles and in changing the politics of other countries. The WTO can 
provide greater policy leverage vis-à-vis potential opponents in the domestic polity. A WTO 
negotiation allows for issue linkage where liberalization in one sector that is conditional on 
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liberalization elsewhere mobilizes exporters. The WTO also allows for legal framing where 
tariffs and subsidies are subject to international law (the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body 
and Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Both issue linkage (that broadens 
the negotiation) and legal framing (that deepens the negotiation), while independent forces, 
increase the stakes and change the aggregation of domestic interests (Davis, 2003). 
Historically, GATT rules on agriculture, however, were shaped around U.S. farm 
policy. But agriculture is slowly moving away from being an exception. It is debatable how 
much trade liberalization has occurred in the WTO specifically.
12 But the WTO has allowed 
for a more inclusive distribution of bargaining power where before WTO negotiations on 
agriculture were a gladiatorial contest between the United States and the EU. During the 
Uruguay Round, the CAIRNS group surfaced and the G-20 has made a large impact in the 
Doha Round negotiations. 
A major incentive for large and small countries alike is to enter trade agreements that 
lower or eliminate trade distorting policy interventions to capture the mutual gains from 
policy disarmament, thereby escaping the prisoner’s dilemma and also lowers adjustment 
costs (Bagwell and Staiger 1999; Grossman and Helpman 1995). This eliminate terms of 
trade effects of all countries policies. The incentive is even more pronounced for small 
countries so that the threat is removed of a large country exercising their power to affect their 
terms of trade. Another major incentive for entering a trade agreement is that governments 
are more able to make credible commitments. This assures their private sector because it can 
retaliate if the plan is not executed. This solves the time inconsistency problem and so locks 
in reforms by tying the government’s hands. 
Trade agreements also facilitate bargaining and cooperation by reducing transaction 
costs, creating forums and side payment opportunities for international bargains through 
contracting, coercion or persuasion. Issue linkage through trade agreements has liberalization 
in one sector conditional on liberalization elsewhere. This mobilizes exporters and changes 
the internal political dynamics. Finally, information-gathering provides transparency and 
facilitates a   reputation mechanism to support cooperation and legitimacy, sometimes by 
constructing norms that permeate domestic politics. 
There are three categories of processes in how trade agreements affect policy 
instrument choice in agriculture. First, negotiating rounds like in the WTO or regional 
agreements like NAFTA reduced agricultural tariffs. The implication is that this forced policy 
re-instrumentation. For example, increased U.S. peanut butter imports resulted after NAFTA, 
thereby putting pressure on the two-price plan. A similar development occurred for Canadian 
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wheat policy. Meanwhile, the expansion of the EU through the accession of southern and 
eastern European countries induced changes in the policy instrument choice to the better. The 
WTO introduced disciplines on domestic support as well with the delineation of the green 
blue and amber boxes. This induced change in the United States and EU towards green box 
type policies. 
The second way in which trade agreements can induce the choice of more efficient or 
less trade-distorting policy instruments is through the dispute settlement procedures. Again, 
examples abound such as the WTO Panel on cross-subsidization of exports with EU sugar 
policy induced a wholesale change in EU sugar policy. The fear of countervailing duties 
disciplines the Canadian beef and hog sectors choice of policy instruments. 
The third way international trade agreements generate better policy instrument choice 
is through accession. China had to undertake many economic reforms before joining the 
WTO like southern and eastern European countries did before joining the EU. Because 
Mexico faced U.S. pressure to reform agricultural policy before joining NAFTA (even 
though the policy instruments used by the United States may have been more trade 
distorting), we describe this in more detail as a case study. 
Mexico’s Experience 
Mexico’s dominant political party had electoral support of millions of maize peasants 
so for political reasons felt compelled to continue subsidizing maize farmers but in a different 
way. NAFTA therefore provided pressure for Mexico to change their policy instrument 
choice. The option Mexico chose was decoupled payments based on historical acreage. There 
was a problem however as there were no land titles so some economists declared the option 
dead on arrival. But decoupled payments were nevertheless introduced but not before 
complementary institutional reform that introduced land titles. Hence, NAFTA is an example 
of not only putting political pressure for changing the policy instrument but also for inducing 
a change in institutions. There are studies that provide a counterargument where opening up 
to trade in countries with weak institutions can make policies and institutions worse (Rodrik; 
Segura-Cayuela 2006). 
Mexico’s reform had much promise because there was, unlike in the United States, a 
time limit and there was to be no updating of the base. In addition, income distribution 
improved (again, unlike in the United States) because of: 
o  A minimum payment of one hectare (1.9 mil. farmers or 30 percent of total number of 
farmers had less than one hectare) 
o  A maximum payment on 100 hectares 
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o  Land reform that allowed renting and so improved efficiency 
o  Small farmers not benefiting from old support prices because: 
o  many were net buyers 
o  maize was often sold at distressed prices at harvest 
o  small peasant agriculture was not well integrated with the market so they 
could not take advantage of price supports in the first place 
However, there have been problems with cash payments in the case of Mexico because of its 
vulnerability to corruption. Furthermore, the payments are no longer transitory and there has 
been some backsliding with the introduction of new price supports. This lends credence to 
Tullock (1989) where rent seeking may be higher with a seemingly more efficient policy 
instrument and to Alston (2007) where transitory cash payments are found to be inferior to 
wholesale policy reform because the former get locked into same status quo bias.
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Guyomard, Mahe, Munk and Roe (1993), Coleman and Tangermann (1997), 
Patterson (1997), Anania (1997), Paarlberg (1997) and Coleman et al. (1996) analyze how 
policy-making at the international level affects domestic policy choices during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations on agriculture. Each of these papers uses some version of Putnam’s 
(1988) concept of linked games to allow for the influence of autonomous international 
(supranational or intergovernmental) organizations. For European agricultural policy, 
Paarlberg (1997) argues that international agreements have little impact while Patterson 
(1997) concludes they have some influence. Coleman and Tangermann (1997) determine, 
however, that European Union domestic policies were shaped by international policy-making. 
Johnson, Mahe and Roe (1993) specify political preference functions for the European Union 
and the United States governments with weights for each interest group and simulate policy 
games. Several possible policy actions by each government are modeled to predict optimal 
negotiating strategies. Kennedy, von Witzke and Roe (1996a,b) develop a two-stage non-
cooperative and cooperative game theoretic approach to analyze the U.S. and EU actions in 
the Uruguay Round on agriculture. Each country chooses policies based on a political 
preference function and Pareto optimal reform results in the cooperative game. 
8.  Concluding remarks on decoupling 
This paper provides an overview of the literature on the political economy of policy 
instrument choice. Before developing theories of inefficient policy instrument choice, a 
resolution of outstanding disagreements in the literature as to what is efficient had to be 
resolved. The disagreements center on the MEB of taxation and the international terms of 
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trade effects. For various reasons, we concluded that neither should be a major consideration 
in ranking the efficiency of alternative policy instruments.  
We then explore why political competition does not ensure that an efficient policy 
instrument is chosen. This leads us to two key theories based on political economic models 
that provide powerful and relevant explanations for inefficient policy instrument choice in 
agriculture: enforcement and commitment problems for promises of policies by politicians, 
and of voting by individuals; and information and agency problems between various 
participants in the political process. We also evaluate the important Grossman-Helpman 
model of inefficient policy choice that falls outside these two general theories. 
The analysis is extended to include the fact that often times instrument choice is a 
discrete 0,1 occurrence in response to a crisis and therefore is path dependent. Policy 
persistence is also widespread and so reasons for a status quo bias are provided. Finally, we 
show how trade agreements have helped improve policy instrument choice. 
The literature has several shortcomings. The models generally make prior 
assumptions about what policies are available without explaining these choices by either 
basic policy transactions costs or political economy models. One cannot always analyze the 
politics of policy instrument choice without explaining the gainers and losers of policies and 
what levels of intervention are chosen. It is also difficult to draw the line between explaining 
inefficient policies versus inefficient institutions (economic, political and legal) that generate 
these inefficient policy instruments.  
The paper gave examples of how governments tend toward taxpayer financed 
decoupled agricultural policies, which is a step in the right direction in improving the 
efficiency of policy instrument choice. But the reforms have been slow and decoupled type 
payments are concentrated mostly in the grains and oilseeds sectors. The degree of 
decoupling is a continuum, with payments based on land constraints or input use, historical 
entitlements or on individual characteristics not related to farming being considered far less 
distorting than the traditional measures of border protection and direct input and production 
subsidies (OECD 1994, 2001). But there is no fully decoupled agricultural support measure 
in theory or in practice. But the reality is more complex, not only in the economic impacts of 
decoupled payments on producer behavior but also the characteristics of the programs 
themselves in their implementation.  
Abler and Blandford (2005) identify five general categories of mechanisms for how 
decoupled payments influence output, even though they are not linked to current farm-level 
production. Payments, especially if they are large, can reduce farmers’ aversion to risk 
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through the ‘wealth effect’. Depending on how payments are disbursed, the variability of 
farm income can also be reduced, thereby reducing risk facing farmers that leads to increased 
output (the ‘insurance effect’). Decoupled payments can affect farmers’ investment and exit 
decisions through relaxing constraints facing them in capital and labor markets. Direct 
payments allow banks to make loans that they otherwise would not and allow farmers with 
specialized skills to stay in agriculture. Because eligibility rules have changed, expectations 
about future policies and dynamic considerations affect current production decisions because 
producers develop expectations about future assistance based on past government actions. 
Payments help farmers cover short run production costs, slowing structural change in 
agriculture. 
Although the experience is that perfectly designed decoupled payments can distort 
trade which can be exacerbated if decoupled programs are implemented imperfectly, the 
evidence still corroborates the OECD (1994, 2001) finding that taxpayer funded decoupled 
payments are more efficient than traditional forms of market interventions. The primary 
motivation for decoupling is to compensate farmers for the move to free markets by 
providing transitional adjustment assistance. This also makes the programs politically more 
palatable and transparent. Ideally, compensation programs would be universal (open to all 
sectors in the economy, not just agriculture) or at least non-sector specific within agriculture. 
A simple and minimally distorting scheme would be a one-time unconditional payment to 
everyone engaged in farming or deemed in need of compensation that is nontransferable, 
along the lines of one-time buyouts. 
However, because a one-time buyout is an unlikely outcome (unless it is well targeted 
in one sector), specific attention should be given to time limits, harmonization with other 
support programs, government credibility, and constraints on input use. Unless these aspects 
are properly addressed, decoupled programs are likely to have the same detrimental effects as 
other subsidy programs. 
Most important, programs should be strictly limited in duration. The United States 
had (at least implicitly) one in the 1996 Farm Bill but violated it three years later. Mexico’s 
reform had a time limit, which so far has not been extended. A time limit helps to ensure that 
payments are made for adjustment purposes only. If there are other (coupled) support 
programs, the decoupled program may not eliminate the incentives to overproduce. In the 
United States, for example, coupled support programs have been maintained or new ones 
added. 
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To maintain government credibility and reduce uncertainty, eligibility rules need to be 
clearly defined and not allowed to change. The time period on which payments are based, the 
level of payments and the sectors covered should all remain fixed. Updating bases and adding 
crops create a government credibility problem, making the decoupling policy time 
inconsistent. If governments have the discretion to change eligibility criteria and payments as 
market conditions change, these commitments will not be viewed as binding. Farmers, 
meanwhile, will change their production decisions to reflect this, thus undermining 
decoupling. Support to specific sectors within agriculture should be in the form of taxpayer-
funded payments. There should be no requirement of production. Land, labor, and any other 
input should not have to be in “agricultural use.” Experience shows the difficulty of 
designing effective decoupling schemes. But strict criteria are required to minimize 
inefficiencies. One way to improve the performance of decoupling schemes might be to have 
the WTO specify the conditions. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 For a survey, see Bullock et al.(1997). 
 
2 This is above and beyond the issues outlined earlier that lump sum transfers are incentive incompatible, incur 
political transactions costs and can involve policy endogeneity. 
 
3 There is also a philosophical reason why a country should not be able to exploit their terms of trade (see de 
Gorter, 1992). 
 
4 Parry (1997) finds production quotas as first best for agriculture but assumes no trade and that decoupled 
payments have no impact on the price of land. 
 
5 It can even be negative with a back-ward bending labor supply curve. 
 
6 Furthermore, consumer transfer schemes like production quotas generates cross-subsidization and deters exit, 
both of which increases the social costs of the transfer (de Gorter, Just and Kropp, 2008). 
 
7 Policy instruments associated with consumer transfers like production quotas and two-price plans inevitably 
introduce more rent-seeking deadweight costs than a simple decoupled payment or a taxpayer financed one-time 
buyout policy. 
 
8 This paper therefore concurs with the general conclusion of the OECD (1994, 2001) that taxpayer financed 
payments for historical entitlements is by far more efficient than most other traditional farm policy 
interventions. 
 
9 Or have agriculture fall under universal social programs like welfare assistance, job retraining programs, trade 
adjustment assistance and the like. 
 
10 The quota buyout experience in the United States for peanuts and tobacco has had their problems nonetheless. 
The peanut quota buyout was equal to the capitalized value of the quota but other coupled and decoupled 
programs were introduced in its place. The tobacco buyout exceeded the capitalized value. 
 
11 The political debate leading up to the current versions of the U.S. Farm Bill repeated the same factors 
described by the Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) thesis. Take Senator Harkin for example, who, although only 
partially successful, lead a very powerful coalition to eliminate decoupled payments because “land no longer 
producing crops should be ineligible for subsidies” and it was “never intended to be a permanent part of our 
agricultural programs”. It was created by 1996 Farm Bill to end federal controls on what farmers grow, he 
argued. He claimed ‘bases’ should be updated in order to save millions of dollars that would be spent on other 
ways. Instead, Senator Harkin favored ‘a smarter, fairer counter-cyclical system that places a strong focus on 
paying farmers when they need the help…It would be based on revenue, not just what we did in the past that 
was based upon price…Because if you didn’t have the crop, then you didn’t get it. Our new deal is going to look 
at not the price or the crop, but the revenue based on it.’ 
 
Senator Harkin’s coalition wanted to make bases smaller, give subsidies to farmers who are farming, and extend 
subsidies to farmers not receiving any subsidies now. This is exactly the prediction of the Acemoglu-Robinson 
model. About $1.3 bil. was given to dead farmers in 1995-2001 (truly a decoupled program that economists 
would favor!) but politicians want live farmers and without zip codes in Hollywood or Bermuda in order to 
develop a political base and get votes.  
 
12 An argument can be made that the issue linkage aspect of the WTO has impeded liberalization by ‘legalizing’ 
protection levels and thereby make matters worse as it becomes a forum for national governments to match 
other countries’ subsidies. The WTO in some ways has also become a means to legislate lax disciplines like the 
AMS. Perhaps reliance on legal framing would be better by allowing countervailing and anti-dumping codes to 
discipline domestic support.  
 
13 This argument is related to the theory of Becker and Mulligan (2003) where cash payments increases rent 
seeking so there is a trade-off. 
 
 